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1 Introduction
There is a presumption, dating at least to Mancur Olson's (1965) classic anal-
ysis of collective action, that small group size is advantageous in inuencing
endogenous policy. The argument is that, under institutions of representa-
tive democracy, governments and candidates for political oce have political-
support needs than can be better satised by \cohesive" coalitions, as these
are less prone to defection and free-riding than more \diuse" coalitions .
Hence, under representative democracy, \the small exploits the large". In
contrast, under direct democracy where voters determine outcomes, larger
group size is more advantageous
1
. An implication of the advantage of small
group size for collective action is that more concentrated industries should
(all else equal) be more successful in securing protection and or in resisting
trade liberalization. Empirical studies have however failed to nd an unam-
biguous relation between industry concentration and policy eectiveness of
an industry (see sthe surveys by Baldwin 1984, Hillman 1989, Potters and
Sloof 1996, and also Goldberg and Maggi 1999). Potters and Sloof (1996,
pp.417-418) summarize the diversity of the extensive empirical evidence as
follows:
\Most scholars indeed nd an increased scope for political inuence with
higher degrees of concentration, but there are many that nd no eect or even
a negative eect. Equally ambiguous are the results of the use of numbers
for the free rider eect. A large number of participants to collective action is
usually hypothesized to increase the free riding problem. Sometimes indeed
a negative eect of numbers on inuence is reported. More often, however, a
positive eect is found. Hence there appears to be relatively little direct em-
pirical support for the Olson (1965) inuential theoretical study on collective
action."
One may therefore well wonder what is going on. In this paper we consider
theoretical foundations for the source of the empirical ambiguities. There
are dierent possible points of departure. One beginning is George Stigler's
(1964) proposal that a theory of oligopoly should start by assuming collec-
tively rational behavior, and then should proceed to investigate the costs of
defection from the cooperative equilibrium. Stigler's perspective on oligopoly
provides a reasonable basis for Olson's collective-action proposition. Smaller
group size increases the probability of detection of free-riding behavior and
1
For an overview of theories of collective action, see Sandler (1992).
1
decreases the general transactions costs of organizing and monitoring contri-
butions to collective action, and so, according to Stigler, more concentrated
industries are expected to be more eective in inuencing endogenous pol-
icy decisions. This is not however the unambivalent picture provided by the
empirical evidence. The alternative non-cooperative Cournot-Nash approach
adopts as a point of departure individually rational behavior. Policy inu-
ence then becomes a case of non-cooperative private provision of a public
good.
In the latter approach, we have well-established results for the case where
consumers choose public good provision (see Cornes and Sandler 1996). If
the public good is a normal good, there are countervailing substitution and
income eects on the contribution decisions of other consumers when one
consumer increases his or her Nash contribution, so that a larger contribu-
tion by one consumer need not decrease the contribution of other consumers.
Increasing group size and thereby adding a new prospective contributor to
the public good therefore can either increase or decrease total contributions.
Also, the total Nash-equilibrium contribution by consumers to provision of
a public good is independent of the distribution of income among those con-
sumers who are making positive contributions to provision of the good (Warr
1983, Kemp 1984, Bergstrom, Bloom and Varian 1986).
The analogy to rms in an industry making contributions in pursuit of
a collective policy objective is investigated in Hillman (1991). Consumers
are replaced by owners of rms who allocate time and attention between
the privately benecial activity of monitoring their rms' production activi-
ties
2
and the public-good benet of persuading policy makers to implement
policies that benet the entire industry. Firm owners have dierent com-
parative advantages in lobbying for protection
3
. Results are obtained that
are analogous to the consumer outcome: redistribution of aggregate industry
prots among a given number of rms in the industry, as implied by a change
in the size distribution of rms or industry concentration, need not change
the aggregate Nash contribution of resources by rms in the industry to the
collective benet of inuencing policy. Prospective neutralities are therefore
introduced into the relation between industry concentration and the eec-
2
For an elegant treatment of the monitoring role of managers, see Vousden and Camp-
bell (1994).
3
Or, rather than rm ownership, management incentive schemes can provide the same
incentive to lobby for industry protection even when this is not in the best interests of
diversied owners of rm. See Cassing (1996).
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tiveness of the collective pursuit of policies benecial to the industry; that is,
changes in concentration as measured by the distribution of prots among
a given number of rms can leave unaected the political inuence of the
industry as measured by the total resources allocated by the industry to
policy persuasion. Changing group size by increasing the number of rms,
the neutralities appear when managerial time and attention available for
allocation between productive activity and seeking political inuence is an
industry-specic input, but not when such inputs are intersectorally mobile.
The model in Hillman (1991) assumes that the domestic industry wherein
rms are contributing to collective policy objective confronts a competitive
world market. International prices of import-competing output are thus ex-
ogenously determined, and the domestic price is determined by the given
world price plus the protection provided as a consequence of rms' contribu-
tions to lobbying eorts. The strategic interdependence amongst rms is thus
only with respect to contributions to inuencing policy, and not with respect
to competition in the product market. This permits the industry seeking pro-
tection (or resisting liberalization) to be placed within the broader context
of a competitive small-country model of international trade.
In this paper we consider the relation between industry concentration and
policy eectiveness in an internationally oligopolistic industry rather than
an internationally competitive industry. As in Hillman (1991), the rms
seeking protection are heterogeneous (see also Long and Soubeyran 1996),
and trade policy is endogenously responsive to the total resources contributed
by domestic rms to inuencing policy. In our model, we show that the
amount of resources that an oligopolist deploys for lobbying has an impact on
the internal cost structure of the oligopoly, under the assumption that either
each rm faces a resource constraint, or each rm faces an upward-sloping
curve of the marginal cost of funds that are to be allocated between political
activities and internal cost-reducing activities. Because of these factors, as
well as the oligopolistic market structure and the consequent endogeneity of
domestic price, contributions by rms to inuencing policy no longer have the
characteristics of contributions to a pure public good. We show how in these
circumstances the industry equilibrium is inuenced by the properties of the
lobbying technology and the domestic demand function, and we establish
how an index of concentration is related to eectiveness of collective action
of the industry. The specic questions which we address are: (i) With rms
diering in comparative advantage in lobbying, what are the characteristics of
the equilibrium allocations by rms between privately protable monitoring
3
and collectively benecial lobbying activities? (ii) Can the ranking of rms'
protability be reversed by the introduction of lobbying possibilities? And
most basically: (iii) What can be said about the conventional wisdom that
more concentrated industries should obtain more protection?
The model which provides the framework for these questions is set out
in Section 2. We consider the outcomes when lobbying by rms is non-
cooperative and cooperative in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. The nal section
summarizes the conclusions.
Before proceeding with the model, we note that our endogenous-policy
specication is general in not presupposing any one particular mechanism
which translates lobbying inputs into endogenous policy outcomes
4
. We sim-
ply assume that an increase in the resources available to the industry to
inuence policy enhances the lobbying eectiveness of the industry. The
model is in principle consistent with an underlying political-support function
of an incumbent government (for example Hillman 1982) or inuence over
candidates' trade policy platforms in the context of political competition
(Hillman and Ursprung 1988, Mayer 1998). In neither type of specication
in the literature do we nd an investigation of the collective-action incentives
associated with industry concentration with which we are concerned
5
. For
example, in the micro-foundations for political support proposed by Gross-
man and Helpman (1994), either an industry has been successful in perfectly
internalizing collective action problems to permit collectively optimal po-
litical behavior, or otherwise the industry is not at all politically active
6
.
Hence, in Grossman-Helpman, the issue of the market structure of the in-
dustry, and the consequences for collective action in responding to the policy
maker's readiness to \sell protection", do not at all arise. In models where
trade policy is endogenously determined as the equilibrium outcome of polit-
ical competition (as in Hillman-Ursprung 1988), market structure implicitly
aects the competing candidates' policy platforms, but in a rather simple
way because of the homogeneity of rms; the political competition models
can in principle address the issue of the relation between concentration and
4
See Potters, Sloof, and van Winden (1997) for a model which encompasses dierent
channels of inuence on voters decisions.
5
The issue is also not addressed in the surveys by Magee (1984) and Rodrik (1995).
6
Grossman and Helpman indeed require the assumption that some industries are not
politically active to avoid a free-trade policy equilibrium, since their choice of equilibrium
implies a Pareto-ecient outcome if all industries are politically active. See also Mitra
(1995).
4
eectiveness of policy inuence, but only in the sense of measurement of in-
dustry concentration in terms of the number of identical rms composing the
industry
7
.
2 The Model
There are n rms producing a homogenous good. The rst k rms are
domestic rms and the remaining n   k = k

rms are foreign rms. Let
K = f1; 2; :::; kg and K

= fk + 1; ::::k + k

g. Their outputs are denoted by
q
i
, i 2 K, and q

j
, j 2 K

. Let
Q =
X
i2K
q
i ;
Q

=
X
j2K

q
j
; Z = Q +Q

All the outputs are sold in the home country, where the inverse demand
function is P = P (Z), P
0
< 0.
The unit variable cost of rm i is c
i
. It is independent of the output level,
but is dependent on the amount of resources (which may be entrepreneurial
time, or funds) devoted to internal cost-reducing activities (such as monitor-
ing or R&D), which we denote by m
i
. We assume that c
i
(0) = c > 0 and
c
0
i
(m
i
)  0. Each domestic rm has a total amount h
i
of resources to be
allocated between cost-reducing activities and lobbying. Let a
i
denote the
amount of resources devoted to lobbying, then a
i
= h
i
  m
i
. Concerning
the quantity h
i
, we consider two cases: in case (i), the amount h
i
is xed
(exogenously given), and in case (ii), the amount h
i
can be chosen, but the
rm must incur a cost 
(h
i
)  0 to obtain h
i
; and 

0
, the marginal cost of
obtaining h
i
, is an increasing function of h
i
. A possible interpretation of case
(i) is that rms have a certain xed amount of money (or time) to spend
on the two classes of activities mentioned above, and if they spend more on
lobbying, then less will be spent on internal activities. A possible interpre-
tation of case (ii) is that h
i
represents the amount of money that can be
obtained from nancial institutions, but the marginal cost of loans, denoted
7
The political competition models of endogenous trade-policy determination are similar
to models of rent seeking for public goods (see the survey of the rent-seeking literature
by Nitzan 1994). Although the model structures are similar (see Urpsrung 1990), the
rent-seeking models focus on establishing the social loss incurred via resource dissipation
in dierent circumstances, whereas the political-competition models of trade focus on
establishing the characteristics endogenous equilibrium policies.
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by 

0
i
(h
i
), is increasing. Alternatively, if h
i
is the amount of time devoted to
monitoring and lobbying, then 
(h
i
) is the entrepreneur's evaluation of lost
leisure. In both case (i) and case (ii), if the resources are money rather than
entrepreneurial time, then some sort of capital market imperfection must be
in the background. In the nance literature, it has been argued that credit
rationing is a response to asymmetric information, and rising marginal cost
of loans is a reection of rm-specic risks, which make the I.O.U. s issued by
the rm a specic asset without perfect substitutes.(See, for example, Milne
1975, Hellwig 1989, and Bester and Hellwig 1987.) In what follows, we focus
on case (i), because the analysis of that case is relatively simpler. Results
for case (ii) are similar to those obtained in case (i), and they are reported
in the Appendix.
While a great deal of lobbying activities are undertaken by hired pro-
fessional lobbyists, the importance of entrepreneurial time in lobbying (and,
more generally, in public relation activities) is also well recognized in the
business world. The frequent public appearances of well-known individuals
such as Lee Ioccoca and Bill Gates are not without opportunity costs in terms
of internal controls. In Canada, when chief executive ocers are chosen, an
important criterion is their connection with Ottawa
8
.
We assume that rms lobby in order to convince the government to impose
a quota B on the aggregate import of the good. We postulate that B is a
decreasing function of aggregate lobbying eort, A =
P
i2K
a
i
and that there
is diminishing returns to lobbying:
B
0
(A) < 0; B
00
(A) > 0
In what follows, for simplicity, the quota is taken to be binding always,
so that Q

= B, and Z = B + Q. It does not matter, therefore, if foreign
rms are oligopolists or not. Domestic rms solve their optimization problem
in two stages. In Stage 1, the a
i
's are chosen, either cooperatively or non-
cooperatively, and this determines the quota B, and the amount m
i
= h
i
 
a
i
 0 is spent on internal cost-reducing activities (monitoring, or R&D).
In Stage 2, given B, domestic rms choose non-cooperatively their output
levels. The game in Stage 2 is a simple Cournot game, the solution of which
is described below.
Given m
i
, rm i's unit cost is c
i
(m
i
), which we denote by c
i
for short.
Firm i takes as given the import volume B and the total output of all other
8
See, for example, the Globe and Mail (11 March, 1999).
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domestic rms, denoted by Q
 i
. It chooses q
i
to maximize prot

i
= P (B +Q
 i
+ q
i
)q
i
  c
i
q
i
(1)
This yields the rst order condition for an interior maximum
q
i
P
0
(B +Q
 i
+ q
i
) + P (B +Q
 i
+ q
i
) = c
i
(2)
The second order condition is
s
id
E
d
< 2 (3)
where s
id
 q
i
=Q is domestic rm i's market share of domestic output, and
E
d
 (QP
00
)=[ P
0
] is the elasticity of the slope of the residual (ie, net of
imports) demand curve. Summing the rst order condition over all domestic
rms yields
QP
0
(B +Q) + kP (B +Q) = C 
X
i2K
c
i
(4)
Equation (??) shows that given the quota B, domestic output Q is a
function of the sum of unit costs, C. Let us denote the left-hand side of (??)
by  (Q;B). We assume that  
Q
< 0. This condition may be expressed as
E
d
< k + 1 (5)
Condition (??) is one of the usual stability conditions of a Cournot equi-
librium, see Dixit (1986). Given this assumption, we can use equation
(??) to obtain the equilibrium domestic output as a function of B and C,
Q = Q(B;C);with
@Q
@B
=
k   E
d
E
d
  k   1
;
@Q
@C
=
1
[ P
0
][E
d
  k   1]
< 0 (6)
It follows that total demand, Z = B + Q, is a function of B and C,
Z = Z(B;C);with
@Z
@B
=
 1
E
d
  k   1
> 0;
@Z
@C
=
1
[ P
0
][E
d
  k   1]
< 0 (7)
Equation (??) shows that lobbying has two eects on equilibrium supply and
hence price. An increase in lobbying will reduce the quota B, thus raising
the equilibrium domestic price. In addition, an increase in lobbying means
7
that, for a given h
i
, less resources will be available for monitoring (or R&D),
hence cost will rise, and this reduces equilibrium domestic output, causing a
further upward pressure on price. (In case (ii), which we analyse briey in
the Appendix, h
i
can be increased, but then a higher marginal cost of funds,


0
(h
i
), will be incurred; thus in this case an increase in lobbying will also
has an impact on the cost of internal activities.) Note that while B depends
only on the sum of the a
i
's, the variable C depends on the whole vector
a = (a
1
; :::; a
k
) and not on the sum of the a
i
's. This observation is crucial,
because it means that the model of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986),
which postulates that only the sum of the contributions matters, does not
apply to our more complex situation.
Let us turn to the equilibrium output of rm i. From (??) we have
q
i
=
P [B +Q(B;C)]  c
i
f P
0
[B +Q(B;C)]g
(8)
and its equilibrium prot is

i
= fP   c
i
gq
i
=
fP [B +Q(B;C)]  c
i
g
2
f P
0
[B +Q(B;C)]g
(9)
In what follows, we assume that if c
i
falls while all the c
j
's (j 6= i) remain
constant, then the equilibrium prot will rise. It can be shown that this
assumption is satised if
(2  s
id
)E
d
 2k (10)
(i.e., if the demand curve is not too convex.)
We now turn to the analysis of the equilibrium in stage 1, the lobbying
stage.
3 Non-cooperative Lobbying
In this section we assume that rms undertake lobbying activities in a non-
cooperative way. This is an instance of a class of problems known as \the pri-
vate provision of a public good." A special case of this class of problems has
been analyzed thoroughly by Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), where
they assume that (i) in the production of the public good, only the sum of
the contributions, A 
P
a
i
, matters, and that (ii) the payo to each player
depends only on this sum, A, and on his own contribution, independently of
8
how much each of the other players contributes. As we have stated above,
their restrictive assumptions mean that their model is not applicable to our
problem, where each rm i's payo depends not only on A but also on C,
and the latter is not a function of the sum A: Clearly, it is important how C
depends on the individual contributions a
i
's. In what follows, we will focus
on three alternative specications of the relationship between C and the a
i
's.
Let us write
c
i
(m
i
) = c  r
i
(m
i
)
where r
i
(m
i
) may be interpreted as the reduction in unit cost due to moni-
toring.
Specication 1: increasing returns to monitoring.
r
i
(m
i
) = 
i
m

i
;  > 1; 
i
> 0; 0  m
i
 h
i
Specication 2: decreasing returns to monitoring.
r
i
(m
i
) = 
i
m

i
; 0 <  < 1; 
i
> 0; 0  m
i
 h
i
Specication 3: constant returns to monitoring.
r
i
(m
i
) = 
i
m
i
; 
i
> 0; 0  m
i
 h
i
Since m
i
= h
i
  a
i
, it is convenient to dene

i
(a
i
) = c  r
i
(h
i
  a
i
) (11)
and 
0
i
(a
i
) may be interpreted as the marginal cost of lobbying, because it
measures the increase in production cost when entrepreneurial resources are
diverted away from internal cost-reducing activities. Let a = (a
1
; :::; a
k
).Then,
with a slight abuse of notation, Z(B;C) = Z(a). From (??), rm i's prot
in stage 2 is

i
=
[P (Z(a))  
i
(a
i
)]
2
[ P
0
(Z(a))]
(12)
To nd rm i's optimal choice of a
i
, given the a
j
's (j 6= i), we maximize
(??) subject to the constraints h
i
  a
i
 0 and a
i
 0. Write the Lagrangian
L = 
i
+ 
i
[h
i
  a
i
] + 
i
a
i
9
The rst order condition is
@L
@a
i
=M(a
i
)N(a
i
)  
i
+ 
i
= 0
where
M(a
i
) 
P   
i
(a
i
)
[ P
0
](k + 1  E
d
)
> 0
and
N(a
i
)   [2k   E
d
(2  s
id
)]
0
i
+ [2  s
id
E
d
]B
0
P
0
At an interior maximum, we must have

0
i
(a
i
) =
[2  s
id
E
d
]B
0
P
0
[2k   E
d
(2  s
id
)]
(13)
(note that both 2 s
id
E
d
and 2k E
d
(2 s
id
) are positive, by (??) and (??).)
Condition (??) has an intuitive interpretation: at an interior maximum, an
increase in the amount of resources devoted to lobbying will increase pro-
duction cost by 
0
i
, (this is the marginal cost of lobbying) and this must be
balanced by the marginal gain from lobbying, which consists of an increase
in price (modied for factors such as market share, and the eect of a price
rise on revenue) brought about by a decrease in the import quota. The max-
imum may occur at a corner: zero contribution to lobbying, if 
0
i
(0) exceeds
the marginal gain (the right-hand side of (??)); or maximum contribution,
a
i
= h
i
, if 
0
i
(h
i
) is smaller than the marginal gain.
The second order condition for an interior maximum is M
0
(a
i
)N(a
i
) +
M(a
i
)N
0
(a
i
) < 0, which amounts to N
0
(a
i
) < 0 because N(a
i
) = 0 at an
interior maximum. If the demand function is linear, P = a  bZ, the second
order condition simplies to
 k
00
i
(a
i
)  bB
00
(A) < 0 (14)
which is satised if 
00
is positive, or not too negative.
The rst order condition (??) can also be written as
s
i
E = 2  2
i
[k + 1  sE] (15)
where s
i
 q
i
=Z, s  Q=Z, E  [ZP
00
]=[ P
0
]; and 
i
is dened by

i


0
i
(a^
i
)

0
i
(a^
i
) + P
0
B
0
(
^
A)
(16)
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where all the derivatives are evaluated at the Nash equilibrium, and the hat
over a variable indicates its equilibrium value. Equation (??) relates rm
i's equilibrium market share to 
i
, which may be taken as a measure of its
comparative advantage in internal cost-reducing activities (which from now
on we will refer to as monitoring for brevity.)
We now seek to determine how the heterogeneity among rms with respect
to lobbying skills aect their relative contributions. Here several concepts of
comparative and absolute advantage present themselves. We list below a few
indicators.
(i) An indicator of absolute advantage in monitoring: If 
i
> 
j
then
rm i is said to have absolute advantage in monitoring over rm j:
(ii) An indicator of comparative advantage in monitoring: Firm i is
said to have comparative advantage in monitoring over rm j if and only if

i
> 
j
, where 
i
is dened by (??). This denition is motivated by the idea
that a rm that has comparative advantage in monitoring would have a high

0
i
, i.e., a high marginal cost of undertaking lobbying activities, see Remark
1 below.
(iii) An equivalent ranking can be obtained by the following denition

i
=
1

i
  1 =
P
0
B
0
(
^
A)

0
i
(a^
i
)
(17)
If 
j
> 
i
then rm j is said to have comparative advantage in lobbying.
Note that 
j
> 
i
if and only if 
j
< 
i
.
The following remarks are in order. From (??) the indicator 
i
is dened
using equilibrium values. It should be noted that
sgn[
i
  
j
] = sgn[
0
i
(a^
i
)  
0
j
(a^
j
)] (18)
where sgn means `the sign of'.Under Specication 3 (constant returns to
monitoring), 
i
> 
j
if and only if 
i
> 
j
. Thus, under constant returns to
monitoring, comparative advantage amounts to the same thing as absolute
advantage.
We now present some results for the case of linear demand, P = P
0
  bZ;
where P
0
> 0, and b > 0.
Proposition 3.1: Assume linear demand and increasing returns in moni-
toring (i.e., specication 1). Then
11
(a) at an interior Nash equilibrium of the lobbying game, rms that are
less ecient in monitoring in absolute terms (low 
j
) will devote more en-
trepreneurial resources to monitoring, and achieve lower cost and greater
prot than other rms. Thus, the availability of lobbying opportunities re-
verses the ranking of rms' protability if the Nash equilibrium is
interior.
(b) there may exist a corner solution which also has the property of
protability ranking reversal.
Proof:
(a) From (??), with E
d
= 0 because of linear demand, we have at an
interior equilibrium

0
i
(a
i
) = 
i
m
 1
i
=
P
0
B
0
k
= 
0
j
(a
j
)
It follows that if 
i
> 
j
> 0 then, since  > 1,
m
j
m
i
=


i

j

1=( 1)
> 1
Therefore, at the interior Nash equilibrium,
c
j
(m
j
) = c 

P
0
B
0
k

m
j
< c
i
(m
i
)
This shows that if two rms (i; j) have 
i
> 
j
> 0 and h
i
= h
j
, then, in
the absence of lobbying opportunities, rm i would have lower cost and thus
higher prot than rm j, but, when lobbying opportunities become available,
at an interior Nash equilibrium, rm i will have higher cost and thus lower
prot than rm j.
(b) To prove part (b), it suces to provide a numerical example. Assume
there are only two domestic rms. Let P
0
= 100; c = 20, b = 1,  = 2,

1
= 2, 
2
= 1, h
1
= h
2
= 5. Assume that the function B(A) takes the
simple form: B(A) = 10(5  A)
2
if 0  A  5 and B(A) = 0 if A  5. Then
the reaction functions of the lobbying game has the following properties. (See
Figure 1.)
The reaction function of rm 1, a
1
= R
1
(a
2
) is given by: R
1
(a
2
) = 5 if
a
2
= 0, R
1
(a
2
) = 5  5a
2
if 0  a
2
 1; and R
1
(a
2
) = 0 if a
2
> 1.
The reaction function of rm 2, a
2
= R
2
(a
1
) is given by: R
2
(a
1
) = 5 if
a
1
= 0, R
2
(a
1
) = 5  (5=3)a
1
if 1  a
1
 3; and R
2
(a
1
) = 0 if a
1
> 3..
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There are three Nash equilibria. The rst Nash equilibrium is an interior
one, with equilibrium values (a
1
; a
2
)=(30=11, 5=11): The second Nash equi-
librium is (a
1
; a
2
)=(5, 0), and the third Nash equilibrium is (a
1
; a
2
)=(0, 5):
At the rst two equilibria, rm 1 earns less prot than rm 2, which shows
that their prot ranking is reversed. Note that the interior equilibrium in this
two-rm example is unstable, while the remaining two equilibria are stable.
The intuition behind Proposition 3.1 is as follows. If lobbying oppor-
tunities do not exist, then, other things being equal, rms with a higher 
will have lower costs and therefore higher outputs and prots. When rms
can lobby, these large rms will tend to divert a lot of entrepreneurial re-
sources to lobbying activities, because they expect a large gain from the rise
in price that accompanies tighter import quotas. Suppose there are just two
domestic rms, and rm 1 is more ecient in monitoring (
1
> 
2
). Then
rm 1's marginal-cost-of-lobbying schedule, 
0
1
(a
1
) is everywhere above that
of rm 2 if h
1
is equal to or is not too dierent from h
2
(See Figure 2, where

0
1
(x) > 
0
2
(x) for any common x.) These schedules are downward-sloping
because  is greater than 1. Firm 1, anticipating that the equilibrium a^
2
is small (the hat denotes the equilibrium value), perceives correctly that its
marginal-benet-of-lobbying schedule is quite high. Therefore it sets a high
a^
1
: Firm 2, knowing that a^
1
is high, perceives its marginal-benet-of-lobbying
schedule to be quite low, so its low a^
2
is justied. The outcome is almost a
free-ride for rm 2: (In the example given in part (b) of the proof, this free
ride for rm 2 occurs at the rst two Nash equilibria, but not at the third
Nash equilibrium.)
For the case of decreasing returns in monitoring, the protability ranking
is not reversed when lobbying opportunities are available:
Proposition 3.2: Assume linear demand and decreasing returns in moni-
toring (ie, specication 2). Then, at an interior Nash equilibrium, rms that
are less ecient in monitoring in absolute terms (low 
j
) will devote less
entrepreneurial time to monitoring, and achieve higher cost and lower prot
than other rms.
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 3.2.
Another interesting question is whether an increase in the number of rms
will reduce the aggregate lobbying eort. The answer is given by Proposition
13
3.3.
Proposition 3.3: Assume that the demand function is linear, P = a  bZ,
and that all domestic rms are identical. Then an increase in the number of
rms, without changing the endowment h
i
of each rm, will reduce aggregate
lobbying eort if and only if a
00
(a)=
0
(a) < 1 (ie, i the elasticity of 
0
is less
than 1).
Proof:
With linear demand and identical rms, the rst order condition (??)
becomes
 k
0
(A=k)  bB
0
(A) = 0
This equation yields
dA
dk
=

0
  
00
A=k
[ 
00
  bB
00
]
where the denominator is negative because of (??) and k  1, and the nu-
merator is positive if a
00
(a)=
0
(a) < 1.2
We now turn to the non-linear demand case. In this case it is convenient to
make use of condition (??). The following proposition relates the comparative
advantage in monitoring with equilibrium market shares and prots.
Proposition 3.4: Assume non-linear demand. Then at an interior Nash
equilibrium,
(a) If the demand curve is locally concave (E < 0), then rms that have
greater comparative advantage in monitoring will have greater market shares
and greater prots.
(b) If the demand curve is locally convex (E > 0), then rms that have
greater comparative advantage in monitoring will have smaller market shares
and smaller prots. (In other words, the availability of lobbying opprtunities
reverses the prot ranking.)
Proof:
From (??), with E 6= 0,
s
i
  s
j
=
2(
j
  
i
)[k + 1  sE]
E
(19)
It follows that
sgn[s
i
  s
j
] = sgn[ E]sgn[
i
  
j
] (20)
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that is, s
i
 s
j
has the same sign as that of 
i
 
j
if E < 0, and has opposite
sign as that of 
i
 
j
if E > 0: Finally, from (??) 
i
= [ P
0
]q
2
i
= [ P
0
]Z
2
s
2
i
.
2
In order to understand the intuition behind Proposition 3.4, we must
explicate the role of E. The following lemma is useful for that purpose. (A
similar result for the tari case was independently proved by Collie, 1993,
and Long and Soubeyran, 1997.)
Lemma 3.1. If E < 0 [respectively, E > 0] so that the demand curve is
concave [respectively, convex], then an exogenous reduction of import quota
will expand the equilibrium output of lower cost domestic rms by more
[respectively, by less] than that of higher cost domestic rms.
Proof:
Assume without loss of generality that rm i has lower cost than rm j
(c
j
  c
i
> 0). From (??) and (??),
q
i
  q
j
=
1
[ P
0
]
(c
j
  c
i
)
and hence
d
d( B)
[q
i
  q
j
] =
1
[ P
0
]
2
(c
j
  c
i
)P
00

@Z
@( B)

which is positive if E < 0.2
It follows from Lemma 3.1 that if E < 0 then lower cost rms have a
stronger incentive to contribute to lobbying. They devote more resources to
lobbying, while still maintaining lower production costs. Figure 4 illustrates
the equilibrium when rm 1 has a comparative advantage in monitoring and
E < 0. Its marginal cost of lobbying, 
0
1
is therefore higher. If it expects a
2
to be small in equilibrium, then its marginal benet curve (as a function of
a
1
) is also high (recall that E is negative) and in equilibrium, its contribution
to lobbying could be slightly more than that of rm 2, without harming its
cost ranking.
In the opposite case where E > 0, all domestic rms still gain from
lobbying, but the higher cost rms expand more relative to the lower cost
rms. One may ask why the lower cost rms do not pretend to be higher cost
rms, by contributing less to lobbying, in order to gain more. The answer
lies in the fact that they know if they were to do so, there would be less
aggregate lobbying, which would be bad for everyone in the home industry.
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We now consider a very special case where all 
i
= 
j
for all i; j, so that
rms dier only with respect to endowments : h
i
6= h
j.
In this case we obtain
the following:
Proposition 3.5: If 
i
= 
j
for a pair i; j, so that these two rms dier
only with respect to endowments, then at a Nash equilibrium where both i
and j contribute, they must achieve the same market share and hence the
same comparative advantage in monitoring if (i) E < 0 and r (m) is strictly
concave, or (ii) E > 0 and r(m) is strictly convex.
Proof:
Take the case E < 0 and r(m) strictly concave. Then from (??) and (??),
if both rms contribute, then sgn[s
i
  s
j
] = sgn[
0
i
(a^
i
)  
0
j
(a^
j
)].
Suppose s
i
6= s
j
: Say s
i
> s
j
. Then 
0
i
(a^
i
) > 
0
j
(a^
j
); which is true if and
only if r
0
(h
i
  a^
i
) > r
0
(h
j
  a^
j
); if and only if m^
i
< m^
j
. This would imply
c
i
> c
j
and hence s
i
< s
j
, a contradiction. It follows that s
i
= s
j
if both
rms contribute.2
From Proposition 3.5 if two rms are identical except for a slight dier-
ence in endowments then at an interior equilibrium their contributions dier
by exactly their dierence in endowments. If their endowments greatly dier
from each other, it is likely that only one rm contributes while the other
free rides.
4 The Cooperative Case
We now consider the case where rms coordinate their lobbying activities,
even though they are Cournot rivals in the product market. This specica-
tion is quite realistic, and is consistent with the theory of semi-collusion (as
exemplied by the by the works of Friedman and Thisse 1993, Fershtman and
Gandal 1994, Nalebu and Brandenburger 1996, Long and Soubeyran 2000,
among others), which is based on the observation that rms often cooperate
in some sphere while compete in other spheres.
The cooperative case is more complicated because in the rst stage of
the game there are incentive for rms to change the cost structure within
the industry so as to reduce rivalry in the second stage. In other words,
allocation of lobbying eorts now serves two distinct purposes. The rst
purpose is to increase protection against foreign imports, and the second
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purpose is to alter the composition or degree of concentration of the domestic
industry. Coordination of lobbying may thus be seen as a surrogate for
cooperation in the second stage (which is often prohibited by anti-trust laws).
In fact, as we will see below, even if rms are ex-ante identical in technology
and endowment, their optimal coordination of lobbying eort may call for
asymmetric contributions.
In order to handle these complicated issues, we must nd a relationship
between aggregate prot of the domestic rms and their cost structure.
Recall that rm i's unit cost is

i
(a
i
) = c  r
i
(h
i
  a
i
)
It is convenient to dene the inverse function
a
i
= a
i
(r
i
)
where r
i
is now real number representing the reduction in unit cost below
the maximum level c. Let r
K
denote the mean reduction in unit cost:
r
K

1
k
X
i2K
r
i
The sum of the unit costs is:
C = k(c  r
K
)
Recall that the equilibrium quantity is Z = B + Q(B;C); where B =
B(A):This can now be written as
Z = Z(A; k(c  r
K
))
The sum of the equilibrium prots of the domestic rms is
 =
X
i2K

i
=
kfP   c+ r
K
g
2
[ P
0
]
+
1
[ P
0
]
X
i2K
(r
i
  r
K
)
2
(21)
(for a proof, see Long and Soubeyran 1996). This formula indicates that for
a given A and a given r
K
(so that both P and P
0
are xed), industry prot
can be increased by increasing the variance V of the cost reduction, where
V 
1
k
X
i2K
(r
i
  r
K
)
2
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To illustrate this possibility, consider the case where r
i
(m
i
) = 
i
m

i
=

i
(h
i
  a
i
)

, with  > 1 Then the function a
i
(r
i
) is convex:
a
i
(r
i
) = h
i
 

r
i

i

1=
Summing over all i, we obtain
X
i2K

r
i

i

1=
=
X
i2K
h
i
  A
For a given A and a given r
K
, the set of feasible (r
1
; :::; r
k
) is illustrated
in Figure 5 for the case k = 2. The reader can also visualize the feasible
set for the case k = 3, where clearly the optimal solution to the problem of
maximizing  in (??) subject to a given A and a given r
K
is asymmetric.
This result on asymmetric contributions is stated as Proposition 4.1:
Proposition 4.1 (Asymmetric contributions)
In the cooperative lobbying case, rms may have incentive to agree on asym-
metric contributions even when they are ex-ante identical.
In the case of constant returns to monitoring, an asymmetric solution will
also typically arise. It suces to illustrate this result for the case of two rms
and linear demand, P (Z) =

P Z. We now show that for any given aggregate
amount A < maxfh
1
; h
2
g devoted to lobbying, given Cournot competition in
stage 2, industry prot is maximized in stage 1 by having all the lobbying
done by only one rm. The proof is as follows. Given A, the equilibrium
price under Cournot rivalry is
b
P = (1=3)[

P  B(A)  
1
(a
1
)  
2
(a
2
)], where

1
(a
1
) = c  
1
(h
1
  a
1
) and 
2
(a
2
) = c  
2
(h
2
  a
2
) where a
2
= A  a
1
 0.
Total prot, for a given A, is
h
b
P   
1
i
2
+
h
b
P   
2
i
2
 (a
1
). This expression
is strictly convex in a
1
. Maximizing (a
1
) with respect to a
1
subject to
a
1
 0 and A  a
1
 0 results in a corner maximum.
In an asymmetric contribution cooperative equilibrium, some rms may
be asked not to contribute to lobbying activities. These rms will earn more
prots than others, in the case of ex-ante identical rms. We do not specify
in this paper how the aggregate industry prot is to be distributed among
rms. A possible approach is to assume that rms make side transfers to
each others, so that no rm will envy other rms. Such an approach has
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been formalized in Long and Soubeyran (1999) in the context of formation
of a research joint-venture by rival oligopolists, where it is also demonstrated
that contributions to a research joint venture may be asymmetric.
In what follows, we characterize the optimal provision of the non-pure
public good. While equation (??) was useful for showing the intuition be-
hind the asymmetric contribution result, whenever the focus is on interior
solutions, it is more convenient to return to the original approach where the
a
i
's are treated as direct choice variables. Industry prot is then
 =
X
i2K

i
=
1
[ P
0
(Z(a))]
X
i2K
[P (Z(a))  
i
(a
i
)]
2
(22)
As shown in Appendix 2, dierentiating (??) with respect to a
j
gives the
following rst order condition for an interior solution for the variable a
j
:
@
@a
j
=
Z(2s  EH)

P
0
(Z)B
0
(A) + 
0
j

k + 1  E
d
  2q
j

0
j
= 0 (23)
where H is the Herndahl index of concentration, dened as
H 
X
i2K
s
2
i
=
X
i2K
h
q
i
Z
i
2
and it can be veried that
H 

Q
Z

2
 s
2
where Q 
P
i2K
q
i
.Using (??) we obtain the (generalized) Samuelsonian
rule of optimal provision of a non-pure public good
h
@Z
@a
i
i
h
@Z
@a
j
i
=
q
i

0
i
q
j

0
j
(24)
This, together with the equilibrium conditions of the Cournot game in the
second stage of the game,
bq
i
=
b
P   
i
[ P
0
]
(25)
determine the optimal vector (a
1
; :::; a
k
).
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To illustrate, consider for simplicity, the case of linear demand, with
P (Z) =

P  Z, and just two domestic rms, with 
i
= c  
i
(h
i
  a
i
)

where
h
1
= h
2
= h, 0 <  < 1, and 
1
> 
2
> 0 Then (??) reduces to
2Q
3


i
(h
i
  a
i
)
 1
 B
0
(a
1
+ a
2
)

  2bq
i

i
(h
i
  a
i
)
 1
= 0; i = 1; 2:
where bq
i
=
b
P   c + 
i
(h
i
  a
i
)

and
b
P = (1=3)[

P   B(A)  
1
  
2
]. It can
be veried that bq
1
> bq
2
and a
1
< a
2
.
The above example shows that at an interior solution, rms with greater
absolute advantage in monotoring will be asked to contribute less resources
to political activities. The intuition is as follows. For any given total amount
of industry lobbying, A, the size of the quota is determined. Therefore the
burden of A should be distributed among domestic rms in such a way that,
given B(A), the domestic industry's prot is maximized, given that the do-
mestic rms are Cournot rivals in stage 2. But from (??), industry prot is
increasing in the variance of cost reduction. Therefore, rms with absolute
advantage in monitoring will be asked to contribute less a
i
so that they be-
come relatively bigger. This is due to the productive eciency consideration.
We now ask the following question: does more heterogeneity among do-
mestic rms lead to more protection? The answer turns out to depend on
the curvature of the demand curve. Recall that Lemma 3.1 says that if the
demand curve is convex (E > 0), then a given reduction in import quota
tends to have an equalizing eect on rms's sizes (i.e., the big rms will
expand by less than the smaller rms.) Therefore the marginal gain in do-
mestic industry's prot, caused by an increase in A, is relatively low. This
means that the industry will not spend much on lobbying. This eect will
be mitigated, however, if rms are ex-ante suciently dierent. Thus we
would expect that if E is positive, then A will be greater, the greater is the
heterogeneity among rms. Now the Herndahl index H is a measure of
heterogeneity: given the number of rms, this index is smallest when rms
are identical. Our reasoning indicates that, if E is positive, there would be a
positive correlation between H and the size of the domestic industry's market
share. The following calculation conrms our intuition. Summing (??) over
all rms, we obtain
2sfsE   k   1g+ 2s(k + ) = (m + )EH (26)
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where  
P
i2K

i
. Assume E 6= 0 then we obtain from (??):
s
2
+
(   1)s
E
 
1
2
( + k)EH = 0
If E > 0, then the above quadratic equation in s has two roots of opposite
signs
9
. Since s must be non-negative, we take the positive root
s =  
1
2

   1
E

+
1
2
s

   1
E

2
+ 2(k + )EH (27)
This equation shows that, if E > 0 then the share of imports in domestic
consumption, B=Z = 1 s is negatively correlated with the Herndahl index
of concentration of the domestic industry. This result should be interpreted
with care because H and  are both endogenous.
Proposition 4.2: Assume E > 0. Then the share of imports in domestic
consumption tend to be inversely related to the degree of concentration of
the domestic industry.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that in an asymmetric oligopoly where domestic rms allocate
entrepreneurial time between lobbying for protection and internal control
(monitoring), the availability of lobbying opportunity may have dierential
eects on the prot of individual rms. In fact, under non-cooperative lobby-
ing, the ranking of prots will be reversed when lobbying becomes possible,
if the monitoring technology exhibits increasing returns, or if the demand
curve is locally convex. Such reversal may be attributed to free riding in a
non-cooperative equilibrium. In the cooperative lobbying case, by denition
there is no free riding. In this case the optimal allocation of lobbying eort
entirely reects the motive of reducing aggregate production cost. Our model
also lends only limited support to the conventional wisdom that industries
with greater concentration tend to obtain more protection. In our model, it
is assumed that rms lobby for quantitative import restrictions, such as an
9
If E < 0, we either have two real roots of the same sign or two complex roots. In the
rst case, any root with s > 1 should be excluded. The second case would indicate that
the assumption that all rms have an interior solution h
i
> a
i
> 0 is not valid.
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aggregate quota. Similar results can also be obtained in a model where rms
lobby for tari protection, see Hillman et al. (2000).
In this paper, whether rms cooperate or not is taken as exogenous. But
our results on prot reversal points strongly to the possibilily of developing
a theory of endogenous coalition formation in the lobbying game. Such a
theory would have a avor similar to that of the theory of endogenous vertical
integration
10
.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1: Proof of (??)
Let C = C
 i
+ c
i
(m
i
). Dierentiating (??) with respect to m
i
yields
@
i
@m
i
=
[P   c
i
] [(2  s
i
)E
d
  2k]
[ P
0
](k + 1  E
d
)
c
0
i
(m
i
) (28)
This derivative is positive if E < 2k=(2  s
id
), ie, if the demand curve is not
too convex.
APPENDIX 2: Proof of (??)
From (??),
@
@a
j
= 2
X
i2K

P   c
i
[ P
0
]

P
0
(Z)
@Z
@a
j
 
2(P   c
j
)
0
j
[ P
0
]
+
X
i2K

P   c
i
[ P
0
]

2
P
00
(Z)
@Z
@a
j
The proof is completed by noting the facts that
P c
i
[ P
0
]
= q
i
and that
@Z
@a
j
=
P
0
B
0
+ 
0
j
[ P
0
][E
d
  k   1]
APPENDIX 3: the case where the total resources are not con-
strained.
We now show that the main results in the text remain essentially un-
changed if the h
i
s are not xed, but instead they can be obtained at a cost,
provided that the marginal cost of obtaining h
i
are rising. In this case, the
expression (??) in the text must be interpreted as gross prot, and net prot
is dene as
e
i
= 
i
  

i
(h
i
)
10
See Gaudet and Long (1996) for a model of endogenous vertical integration.
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where 

i
(h
i
) is the cost of obtaining h
i
.
It is convenient to dene

i
(a
i
; h
i
)  c  r
i
(h
i
  a
i
) (29)
and, with a slight abuse of notation, we write

0
i
(a
i
; h
i
) =
@
i
@a
i
= r
0
i
(m
i
)
We interpret 
0
i
(a
i
; h
i
) as the marginal cost of lobbying, because it measures
the increase in production cost when resources are diverted away from mon-
itoring. Let a = (a
1
; :::; a
k
) and h = (h
1
; :::; h
k
). Then, with a slight abuse of
notation, Z = Z(a; h). From (??), rm i's net prot in stage 2 is

net
i
=
[P (Z(a; h))  
i
(a
i
; h
i
)]
2
[ P
0
(Z(a; h))]
  

i
(h
i
) (30)
To nd rm i's optimal choice of a
i
and h
i
, given the a
j
's and h
j
(j 6= i),
we maximize (??) subject to the constraints h
i
  a
i
 0 and a
i
 0. Write
the Lagrangian
L = 
net
i
+ 
i
[h
i
  a
i
] + 
i
a
i
The rst order conditions are
@L
@a
i
= ,
i
r
0
i
(m
i
) + 
i
  
i
+ 
i
= 0 (31)
and
@L
@h
i
=  ,
i
r
0
i
(m
i
)  

0
i
(h
i
) + 
i
= 0 (32)
where
,
i

@
net
i
@Z
@Z
@C
+
@
net
i
@c
i
=
(P   c
i
)[E
d
(2  s
id
)  2k]
[ P
0
](k + 1  E
d
)
< 0 (33)
and

i

@
net
i
@Z
@Z
@B
B
0
=
(P   c
i
)(2  s
id
E
d
)P
0
B
0
[ P
0
](k + 1  E
d
)
> 0 (34)
We will focus on the case of an interior maximum. Then (??) gives

0
i
(a
i
; h
i
) =
[2  s
id
E
d
]B
0
P
0
[2k   E
d
(2  s
id
)]
(35)
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(note that both 2   s
id
E
d
and 2k   E
d
(2   s
id
) are positive, by (??) and
(??).) The condition (??) has an intuitive interpretation: at an interior
maximum, an increase in the amount of resources devoted to lobbying will
increase production cost by 
0
i
, ( this is the marginal cost of lobbying) and
this must be balanced by the marginal gain from lobbying, which consists
of an increase in price (modied for factors such as market share, and the
eect of a price rise on revenue) brought about by a decrease in the import
quota. If the maximum occurs at a corner, we must have, in the case of zero
contribution to lobbying, 
0
i
(0; h
i
) exceeds the marginal gain (the right-hand
side of (??)); or, in the case of zero monitoring, a
i
= h
i
> 0, r
0
i
(0) is smaller
than the marginal gain from lobbying.
An interior maximum also implies
 ,
i
r
0
i
(h
i
  a
i
) = 

0
i
(h
i
) (36)
This condition says that the marginal increase in gross prot obtained from
increased monitoring must be equated to the marginal cost of obtaining re-
sources for monitoring.
The second order conditions for an interior maximum are
@
2
L
(@a
i
)
2
 0;
@
2
L
(@h
i
)
2
 0;
@
2
L
(@a
i
)
2
@
2
L
(@h
i
)
2


@
2
L
@a@h
i

In the case of linear demand, with P = a bZ, the rst two of these conditions
reduce to
kr
00
i
(h
i
  a
i
)  bB
00
(A)  0 (37)
and
2k
2
(r
0
i
)
2
b(k + 1)
2
+
2k(P   c
i
)r
00
i
b(k + 1)
  

00
i
(h
i
)  0 (38)
Condition (??) is satised if r
00
i
is negative, or not too positive, and condition
(??) is satised if 

00
(h
i
) is a suciently great positive number, or if r
00
i
is
suciently negative.
The following lemma will be useful:
Lemma A.1: If two rms i and j both have interior solutions, then the
following relationship must hold:
q
i
[(q
i
=Q)E
d
  2]
q
j
[(q
j
=Q)E
d
  2]
=


0
i
(h
i
)


0
j
(h
j
)
(39)
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Proof: From (??) and (??) we obtain

i

j
=


0
i
(h
i
)


0
j
(h
j
)
Use this and (??) to obtain (??).
Remark: In the special case where 

i
and 

j
are linear and have the
same slope (e.g. when rms face a perfect capital market), then (??) implies
that q
i
= q
j
if both rms have interior solution 0 < a
t
< h
t
, t = 1; 2. Thus,
in this special case, rms would achieve the same cost reduction, because the
lobbying decision and the cost reduction decision become separable under
perfect capital market conditions. We will focus on the case of imperfect
capital market. The proofs of the following propositions are straightforward,
and will be omitted.
Proposition 3.1 A: If the functions 

j
(h
j
) are strictly convex, then
Proposition 3.1 in the text remains valid .
Remark: the proof is similar to that of Proposition 3.1, except that the
h
i
are now determined endogenously by the conditions


0
i
(h
i
)


0
j
(h
j
)
=
P   c+ 
i
m

i
P   c+ 
j
m

j
(40)
Note the importance of the strict convexity assumption on the 

j
(:) func-
tions. If these functions were linear and identical, then an interior solu-
tion is not possible, because it would imply both m
j
=m
i
= (
i
=
j
)
1=
and
m
j
=m
i
= (
j
=
i
)
1=(1 )
.
Proposition 3.2 A: If the functions 

j
(h
j
) are strictly convex, then
Proposition 3.2 in the text remains valid . In addition, if 

j
(:) = 

i
(:) for
all i; j then it can be shown that 
i
> 
j
implies h

i
> h

j
.
Proposition 3.3 A: If the functions 

j
(h
j
) are strictly convex, and


j
(:) = 

i
(:) for all i; j., then Proposition 3.3 in the text remains valid, with
the words \without changing the endowments h
i
of each rm" replaced by
\without changing the functions 

i
(:) for all i ."
Proposition 3.4 A: If the functions 

j
(h
j
) are strictly convex, then
Proposition 3.4 in the text remains valid, and we also have the following
additional conditions to determine the equilibrium h

i
:
q
i

q
i
E
d
Q
  2
 
P
0
B
0
E
d
  k   1

= 

0
i
(h
i
); i 2 K:
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Figure 2
The Case: E = 0, δ1 ≥ δ2 , and Increasing Return to Monitoring
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Figure 3
The Case: E = 0, δ1 ≥ δ2 , and Decreasing Return to Monitoring
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The Case: E ≤ 0, θ ’1 (â1) ≥ θ ’2 (â2) , s1 ≥ s2
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Asymmetric Cost Reductions
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